

























































Un ive rs i t y  o f  He ide lbe rg  
Discussion Paper Series   No. 623   
Department of Economics 
Decentralized versus Statistical Targeting of  
Anti-Poverty Programs: Evidence from Burkina Faso 
Michael Schleicher, Aurélia Souares, 
 Athanase Narangoro Pacere,  
Rainer Sauerborn, and Stefan Klonner 
November 2016 
Decentralized versus Statistical Targeting of Anti-Poverty
Programs: Evidence from Burkina Faso
Michael Schleicher∗†
Schleicher@uni-heidelberg.de
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
Im Neuenheimer Feld 330, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
Aure´lia Souares
Souares@uni-heidelberg.de
Institute of Public Health, University of Heidelberg
Im Neuenheimer Feld 324, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
Athanase Narangoro Pacere
Athanpace@yahoo.fr
Nouna Health Research Centre, Ministry of Health
BP 02 Nouna, Rue Namory Keita, Sect 6 Nouna, Burkina Faso
Rainer Sauerborn
Rainer.sauerborn@urz.uni-heidelberg.de
Institute of Public Health, University of Heidelberg
Im Neuenheimer Feld 324, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
Stefan Klonner
Klonner@uni-heidelberg.de
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
Im Neuenheimer Feld 330, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
November 22, 2016
∗Corresponding author: Phone +49-6221-548923, Fax 0049-06221-545596
†We thank Alice Mesnard, Ken Harttgen, and Kristina Kis-Katos for valuable comments. Jan Melcher and
Marwa Mahran provided invaluable assistance in preparing the data. The usual disclaimer applies.
i
Abstract
Targeting of national anti-poverty programs in low-income countries commonly relies
on statistical procedures involving household-level survey data, while small-scale poverty-
alleviation programs often employ so-called community-based targeting, where village com-
munities themselves identify program beneficiaries. Combining data from community-based
targeting exercises in north-western Burkina Faso with household-level survey data, we com-
pare the targeting accuracy of community-based targeting with several statistical procedures
when the program’s purpose is to target consumption-poor households. We find that the
community-based assessment targets a similar share of consumption-poor households as the
best-performing statistical procedures which are not calibrated with household-level consump-
tion data. Community-based targeting performs relatively better in urban than in rural areas
and is not at a disadvantage in larger or more heterogeneous communities. In a cost-benefit
analysis we find that in our sub-Saharan African context community-based targeting is far
more cost-effective than any statistical procedure for common amounts of welfare program
benefits.
Keywords: Targeting, Community-based Targeting, Welfare Programs, Poverty, Community
Wealth Rankings, Proxy-means Testing
JEL Codes: G22, I13, I38, O15
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1 Introduction
Poverty reduction programs designed to directly improve the well-being of the poor have become
increasingly popular around the global South (Coady et al., 2004a). When a program’s purpose
is to maximize poverty reduction under a limited budget, its success depends on the program’s
individual welfare effects as well as on the accuracy of the underlying targeting method (Ravallion,
1993). In low-income countries, where administrative data on households’ incomes (’means’)
are typically unavailable, targeting of welfare programs tends to rely on statistical procedures
processing suitable proxies of households’ means in a Proxy-Means Test (PMT). Alternatively,
targeting may be decentralized through Community-based Targeting (CBT), where the choice of
beneficiaries is delegated to local communities (Ravallion, 2003).
Both statistical and decentralized targeting methods have their pros and cons, so that from a
policymaker’s perspective each approach may be chosen on reasonable grounds. Existing studies
mention superior cost-effectiveness (Chambers, 1994b) and higher satisfaction rates (Alatas et al.,
2012; Schu¨ring, 2014; Robertson et al., 2014) as two advantages of community-based over statistical
targeting methods. In addition, local participative assessments are found to consider more poverty
dimensions than only consumption (Alatas et al., 2012; Van Campenhout, 2007) and to improve
local ownership and sustainability of the underlying program (Robertson et al., 2014). On the
other hand, decentralization of political decision making is more susceptible to capture by local
elites (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). In contrast, PMT-based
targeting is the more transparent and replicable procedure, and can avoid potential principal-
agent problems (Ravallion, 1993). Hence, if a central government aims to retain control over the
targeting procedure, preference will likely be given to statistical methods. In a comprehensive
review of targeted anti-poverty interventions around the global South, Coady et al. (2004a) find
that statistical and decentralized targeting methods are similarly often employed. They conclude,
however, that ’(t)here is little documented evidence on community-based targeting as compared
to other methods’ (see also Conning and Kevane, 2002).
In this paper we aim to fill this research gap by investigating which method, community-
based or statistical targeting, targets consumption-poor households more accurately. We compare
community-based targeting with five frequently used PMT procedures, where our reference is a
hypothetical targeting outcome based on survey consumption. In addition, we study how the
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targeting accuracy of the two families of methods compares across alternative PMT specifications,
across rural and urban sectors, and across community characteristics. Finally, we evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of each procedure. In our empirical analysis, we combine data from commu-
nity targeting exercises conducted in 35 villages and 22 urban neighborhoods in north-western
Burkina Faso in 2009 with household survey data that includes consumption as well as common
proxy-means variables. We also use census data to construct community characteristics, and
administrative cost data for a cost-effectiveness analysis.
All PMT indices which we consider have in common that they are calculated as weighted
averages of potentially transformed proxy-means variables, while they differ along three dimen-
sions, the set of indicators, the way these indicators are transformed into proxy-variables, and
the weights used to aggregate the proxy-variables into a single index. Accordingly, we distin-
guish between four types of proxy-means tests; first, a PMT based on a linear regression model,
which typically employs a large number of indicators available in census data. The indicators are
usually not transformed and the weights are obtained from a regression of consumption on proxy-
means variables (Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014). We will call this procedure
Consumption-oriented PMT. Alternatively, the weights can be obtained from the joint distribution
of the indicators themselves through Principal Component Analysis, or PCA for short (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001). We will call this procedure PCA-based PMT. Third, we consider two scorecards
which rely on a limited set of transformed indicators, India’s Below the Poverty Line scorecard
(Government of India, 2002) and the Poverty Scorecard Index, a targeting tool popular among
practitioners (Schreiner, 2015). Finally, we calculate a Multidimensional Poverty Index. Follow-
ing Alkire and Santos (2010), in this approach all indicators are first transformed into binary
deprivation indicators and the index equals a weighted deprivation count.
Our findings are as follows. First, community-based targeting is substantially less accurate
than the consumption-oriented proxy-means test but more accurate than several other common
PMTs. It is about as accurate as the best-performing PMTs not relying on consumption infor-
mation for the construction of weights, the PCA-based PMT and the Below the Poverty Line
scorecard. Second, relative to PMT methods, CBT performs slightly better in urban than in
rural areas. Third, targeting errors of all PMTs and CBT respond almost identically to commu-
nity characteristics, namely community size, economic inequality and heterogeneity along ethnic
and religious lines. Finally, we find the consumption-oriented and PCA-based PMTs to be more
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cost-effective than community-based targeting only for very large transfer amounts. Hence, for
common anti-poverty programs, decentralized targeting is by far the more cost-effective method
in our context when the reduction of consumption poverty is the targeting objective.
Within the vast economic literature on targeting of welfare programs, our study contributes
to the topic of targeting accuracy.1 Until recently, the literature on this topic has followed a
rather narrow approach: the focus is typically on one specific targeted anti-poverty program at
a time and targeting accuracy is measured by the share of households meeting the program’s
targeting criteria in all beneficiary households (Ravallion, 2009). The empirical analysis usually
combines households’ self-reported program eligibility with socio-economic variables to estimate
the program’s targeting accuracy.2
A more recent set of studies has taken a broader approach to the topic of targeting accuracy
by comparing alternative targeting methods in one empirical setting. This small but rapidly
growing literature employs consumption as the reference and the variation in targeting methods
comes either from alternative treatments (Alatas et al., 2012) or hypothetical calculations with
household-level survey data (Filmer and Scott, 2012; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2013; Klasen and
Lange, 2014). Within this recent comparative targeting accuracy literature one can distinguish two
branches. The first one contains comparisons of various alternative proxy-means tests’ targeting
accuracy (Grosh and Baker, 1995; Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014), while the
second branch consists of comparative assessments of community-based targeting and one specific
PMT (Alatas et al., 2012; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2013).
Our main contribution is to merge these two so far disconnected branches of the recent com-
parative literature on targeting accuracy. We achieve this by comparing the accuracy of CBT with
the five most prominent PMTs in one empirical setting. In particular, we are first to compare
CBT with all major PMT methods, including a comprehensive PCA-based PMT, in a comparative
targeting accuracy analysis. Further innovations are that we differentiate between rural and urban
sectors, consider the role of community characteristics, and carry out a careful cost-effectiveness
analysis with administrative cost data. An additional contribution is that ours is the first com-
1Other prominent themes are leakage (Alatas et al., 2013b; Niehaus and Atanassova, 2013), elite capture (Alatas
et al., 2012, 2013a; Panda, 2015), agency problems in decentralization (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Banerjee et al.,
2014), and communities’ poverty perceptions (Van Campenhout, 2007; Kebede, 2009; Alatas et al., 2012).
2Some prominent examples are Banerjee et al. (2007) for food distribution, housing and employment schemes in
India, Skoufias et al. (2001) for Progresa in Mexico, Ahmed and Bouis (2002) for food subsidies in Egypt, Handa
et al. (2012) for cash transfer programs in Malawi and Kenya, and Castan˜eda (2003) for Columbia’s SISBEN. We
describe this latter program in more detail in section 2. The review by Coady et al. (2004a) summarizes studies of
122 anti-poverty programs in 48 countries.
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parative study of targeting accuracy for a sub-Saharan African context, where community-based
methods have been employed more frequently than anywhere else (Garcia et al., 2012; Handa
et al., 2012).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly review
proxy-means tests and community-based targeting. The empirical setting is the subject of section
3. Section 4 introduces the empirical methodology. Section 5 contains the empirical results. In
section 6 we discuss our findings. The final section concludes.
2 Statistical versus community-based poverty targeting
PMTs are a relatively recent but increasingly popular targeting tool in low-income countries
(Coady et al., 2004a). In Latin America, PMT-based targeting has been used for large-scale cash-
transfer programs in Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades), Colombia (Familias en Accio´n), and Chile
(PASIS and SUF). National food-subsidization programs such as those in Indonesia and Egypt
use PMT-based targeting as well (Coady et al., 2004a; Ahmed and Bouis, 2002). PMTs are also
popular among small-scale poverty reduction programs, where often only a small set of indicators
is used. In practice, PMT-based targeting is often combined with a first-stage geographic targeting
procedure (Coady et al., 2004a).3
Proxy-means testing typically relies on self-reported (and sometimes validated) information on
a household’s demographic, occupational, and asset structure to calculate for each household in
a population a wealth index, the approximate ’means’ of a household.4 A household is targeted
if its index value falls short of a pre-specified cutoff, which may be defined in absolute terms or
as a population quantile. The wealth index is calculated as a weighted average of proxy-means
variables and, in general, involves three choices; first, the set of indicators: given the high cost
of data collection for entire populations, often indicators available from existing census data are
used (Ravallion, 2009); second, the transformation of each indicator into a proxy-means variable,
and third the index weights. We discuss the five PMTs which we consider along these lines and
contrast them with community-based targeting.
3Two examples are the Mexican Progresa program (Skoufias et al., 2001) and the national cash transfer program
in Indonesia (Alatas et al., 2012).
4Such information is usually preferred over self-reported income or expenditures for several reasons. First,
collecting detailed income or consumption data for an entire population is very costly. Second, both measures leave
more room for strategic misreporting and can be hardly verified by the enumerator. Finally, income often suffers
from considerable short-term fluctuations (Alatas et al., 2012).
4
Consumption-oriented proxy means testing
This method typically uses a large set of proxy-means variables. The indicators are often obtained
from census data and may or may not be transformed (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Klasen and
Lange, 2014; Alatas et al., 2012). Weights are obtained from a regression of per capita consumption
on the set of proxy-means variables. More precisely, regression coefficients are used as weights for
the entire population. Hence, for a given household, its wealth index equals its predicted value of
consumption in a linear regression sense. The data used for this exercise typically comes from a
sample survey (Filmer and Scott, 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2014). This approach, hence, requires
consumption data for at least a subset of households. When a program’s purpose is to reduce
consumption poverty, this approach is easily motivated by the fact that the resulting index is the
best linear predictor of household consumption given the information available in a population
census. Most of the recent comparative targeting accuracy literature analyzes this PMT, and the
large-scale cash transfer programs in Mexico (Progresa) and Indonesia (BLT) are two prominent
applications.
Principal component analysis
In what we call a PCA-based PMT weights are obtained from the joint distribution of the proxy-
means variables themselves. Specifically, principal component analysis (PCA) is used to reduce a
large set of proxy-means indicators to a small set of orthogonal linear combinations of the variables
that best capture the variation in the original indicators. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001),
the first principal component is used as wealth index and its so-called factor loadings as weights.
The PCA-based index is most frequently used to proxy a household’s socio-economic status
in the absence of consumption data and has been particularly popular in health-related studies
that rely on data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Depending on the discipline,
the PCA-based index is named differently; in health and epidemiology it is usually called ’wealth
index’ (Howe et al., 2009) or ’index of socio-economic position’ (Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2003),
while in economics and demography it is often referred to as ’asset index’ (Sahn and Stifel, 2003).
No study in the recent targeting accuracy literature considers a comprehensive PCA-based PMT.5
While in general less popular in the area of targeting, we are aware of one prominent application,
5Karlan and Thuysbaert (2013) consider a PCA-based index where five housing variables are aggregated into a
housing index.
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Columbia’s Sistema de Seleccio´n de Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales (SISBEN), which has
been in effect for more than twenty years. In this system, eligibility for various social programs
relies on a wealth index with 13 proxy-means variables and PCA-based weights (Castan˜eda, 2003).
Scorecards
In comparison to the just discussed two PMTs, scorecards typically rely on a smaller set of
indicators. By means of a scorecard each indicator realization is transformed into an indicator
score, which typically takes only integer values. The sum of indicator scores gives the wealth
index, here called wealth score. The mappings of indicator realizations into indicator scores
simultaneously delivers the transformation of each indicator and the weighting between indicators.
A property the scorecard approach has in common with all other PMTs considered here is that
the final wealth index is additively separable in the individual indicators. The indicator scores are
usually obtained using either regression techniques or common sense. We include the following
two scorecard-based PMTs into our targeting accuracy analysis.
First, we consider the Poverty Scorecard Index (PSI). It was initially developed by a microlen-
der in Bosnia-Herzegovina and primarily used to measure the microfinance institution’s outreach
to the poor and the institution’s impact on customers’ welfare. It has subsequently been man-
aged on a global scale by Grameen Foundation and, lately, the non-governmental organization
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), where it is called Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI). The
index has also been used for targeting of anti-poverty interventions and is increasingly used in
contexts other than microfinance, such as health and education (Schreiner, 2015; Alkire et al.,
2015). According to IPA’s 2014 report, the PSI is being used by more than 200 organizations
for anti-poverty programs around the global South. Among them are the Bangladesh Rural Ad-
vancement Committee (BRAC), the Grameen Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the International
Finance Corporation (Innovations for Poverty Action, 2014). Customized scorecards for 46 coun-
tries are available as of 2016. The selection of indicators is based on ’statistics and judgment’ and,
similar to the consumption-oriented PMT, indicator scores are obtained from national expendi-
ture surveys through regression techniques with consumption poverty as the dependent variable
(Schreiner, 2015, p.556). In our analysis, we use the 2011 version of the PPI scorecard for Burkina
Faso developed by Mark Schreiner, which we have retrieved from IPA’s website in January 2016.
Second, we calculate an index based on the Below the Poverty Line (BPL) scorecard, which
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was developed by an expert group commissioned by the Indian government in 2001 (Government
of India, 2002). The expert group’s task was to develop an index that allows to assess each
household’s quality of life (Government of India, 2002, paragraph 3.24.3). The BPL criterion
is used in India’s public food distribution system and for several poverty alleviation programs
administered by the Ministry of Rural Development (Sundaram, 2003). The indicator selection
builds on India’s 2001 census questionnaire. The scorecard includes thirteen indicators and a score
of between zero and four is assigned to each realization. Its methodology has been vividly debated
in the policy as well as the academic community (Sundaram, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2007; Alkire
and Seth, 2013).
The Multidimensional Poverty Index
In this approach all indicators are first transformed into binary deprivation indicators and the
relevant poverty index is a weighted deprivation count. The so-called Global MPI (Alkire et al.,
2015) comprises ten indicators from three different dimensions of well-being, education, health,
and standard of living. Its weights are equal across and within the three dimensions of well-being,
such that the sum of all indicator weights within a dimension always equals one third. The MPI
and scorecards have in common that they involve normative judgments regarding the selection
and the transformation of indicators, as well as the choice of weights.
The Global MPI was developed for the United Nations Development Programme. It is annually
reported in the Human Development Report and is calculated for more than one hundred countries
(Alkire and Santos, 2014). Its primary purpose is the measurement of multidimensional poverty
in the developing world given common data constraints. In addition, Alkire and Santos (2010)
argue that the methodology underlying the global MPI may also serve as a tool for the targeting
of anti-poverty programs (see also Alkire et al., 2015). Along these lines, four recent studies
compare targeting based on the MPI methodology with other targeting approaches, such as the
BPL scorecard (Thomas et al., 2009; Alkire and Seth, 2013; Azevedo and Robles, 2013; Robano and
Smith, 2013). We are aware that the MPI intends to capture a different, more multidimensional
concept of poverty than our consumption benchmark. Due to its popularity in policy applications
and its ambitions for targeting, we find it nonetheless of interest to include it in our comparative
analysis to see how suited (or not) it is for proxying for consumption poverty.
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Community-based targeting
In community-based targeting the choice of beneficiary households is delegated to local communi-
ties (Ravallion, 1993). The approach usually includes a so-called community wealth ranking and
has earlier often been called Rapid Rural Appraisal, or RRA for short. According to Chambers
(1994a), RRAs were pioneered in the late 1970’s because of a growing discontent with statistical
poverty assessments and, in particular, their relatively high costs. Since then, community wealth
rankings have not only been used for poverty assessments (see, for instance, Devereux and Sharp,
2006; McGee, 2004; Van Campenhout, 2007) but have also emerged as a targeting tool.
Recent examples include small to medium-scale asset creation programs geared at the ultra-
poor and funded by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). Karlan and Thuysbaert
(2013) analyze one such program in Honduras and Peru. Banerjee et al. (2007) investigate CBTs
within the context of a similar asset-creation program in rural India. Community-based targeting
is also sometimes used on a larger scale. In their cross-country analysis of targeted anti-poverty
interventions, Coady et al. (2004a) find that, overall, community-based targeting is similarly often
used as proxy-means testing, equally popular on all continents and especially wide-spread in very
poor countries.
[Table 1 about here]
To the best of our knowledge, there is no structured summary of the procedural details of
community-based targeting in the extant literature. Therefore, in Table 1, we review fifteen stud-
ies of CBTs, inclusive of the intervention studied in this paper (Souares et al., 2010), which are
sufficiently explicit regarding procedural details. Eight have been implemented in sub-Saharan
Africa. All fifteen instances have in common that the targeting exercise involves the entire com-
munity, at least at an initial stage. They differ along four characteristics, which are set out in
columns 1 to 4 of Table 1. First, most CBT exercises start with a public focus group discussion
to elicit communal wealth and poverty perceptions, and sometimes also to define wealth brackets.
Second, in most of the CBTs summarized in Table 1, all households of the community are assigned
to the different wealth brackets. Third, in eight of the studies, a complete wealth ranking of house-
holds is undertaken by sorting households within each wealth bracket subsequently. Finally, there
is variation regarding agency. In particular, the assignment of households to wealth brackets as
well as the comprehensive ranking may be carried out either by the community as a whole or by
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a small number of elected local informants.
3 Empirical setting and data
3.1 The community-based targeting exercise
The empirical setting of our study is the administrative department of Nouna in the North West
of Burkina Faso, depicted in Figure 1. At the time of our study, it was inhabited by a population
of about 80,000 individuals of whom two-thirds live in villages and one third in and around the
town of Nouna, the only urban area (see Figure A1 of the Online Appendix for a detailed map).
The majority of inhabitants are farmers. Since 2006 all households in the study area have had the
opportunity to purchase micro health insurance from a formal not-for-profit provider. Despite of a
seemingly affordable insurance premium, overall health insurance enrollment rates had remained
far below expected levels. As enrollment rates were especially low among poor households (Souares
et al., 2010), in 2007 the insurer decided to offer a fifty per cent discount on the premium to the
poorest quintile of households in each community. To be precise, the insurer’s program proposal
to the ethical review committee of Burkina Faso states the intention to “identify the twenty per
cent poorest households (...) such that they could benefit from health insurance at lower prices”
(Savadogo and Souares, 2007, p.2).
[Figure 1 about here]
For the targeting of households the insurer employed CBT exercises, which were carried out at
the level of villages and urban neighborhoods during the first quarter of 2009.6 In each community,
the procedure started with a publicly convened community meeting, where the facilitators first
informed about the purpose of the meeting. Detailed transcripts of these meetings confirm that
the official targeting objective of the insurer stated above was also communicated on the ground
(Savadogo et al., 2015). The facilitators then initiated a focus group discussion to elicit criteria
regarding poverty and wealth. The two most often stated criteria for characterizing poverty, ’has
insufficient food’ and ’has nothing’, directly or indirectly relate to consumption (Savadogo et al.,
2015, p.8).
6For the purpose of the targeting exercise, each of the seven administrative sectors of Nouna town was divided
into up to four neighborhoods with similar numbers of households (see Figure A2 for a map).
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The community was then instructed to use these criteria for defining three to four wealth
brackets. In a third step, the community assembly elected three local key informants by acclama-
tion. Physically separated from the assembly and each other, each key informant first assigned
each household to one of the previously defined wealth brackets and, second, ordered all house-
holds within each bracket. While the number of households eligible in the respective community,
m say, was fixed in advance by the implementer, neither the community nor the key informants
were briefed about it. In a final step, the set of beneficiary households was determined according
to the following rule: First, households which had been ranked among the m poorest by all three
informants were automatically eligible (about 40 percent of beneficiary households; see Table 2).
Second, all households which had been ranked among the m poorest by exactly two informants
were included, provided that the resulting number of beneficiaries did not exceed m, and, in a
consultation among the key informants, the remaining beneficiary households were chosen from
the set of households which had been ranked among the m poorest by exactly one of the three
informants previously. Otherwise, only a subset of the households which had been ranked among
the m poorest by exactly two informants were included. In particular, households in this group
were sorted by their median rank and those with the highest median ranks were excluded. This
occurred in ten of the 57 communities. On average, the entire exercise took half a day.
3.2 Data
For the empirical analysis we match a cross-sectional household survey with data from the community-
based targeting exercises. The household survey covers 748 households in all of the 35 villages and
22 urban neighborhoods. It involves a clustered stratified random sampling methodology. Data
collection took place between September and November 2009, right after the rainy season. Our
CBT data set contains all three key-informants’ ranks as well as the final eligibility status for
18,871 households.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the targeting exercise by sector. The average community
size is about 110 households and 20 per cent of households in each community were targeted.
On average, there is a sizable positive correlation of 0.66 between the three informants’ rankings
as measured by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, and this applies to rural and urban
communities alike. Nonetheless, if we define an individual key informant’s target group by his
m lowest-ranked households, a unanimous agreement occurs for only 40 percent of beneficiary
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households.
[Table 2 about here]
The merged dataset contains 561 households, for which summary statistics are set out in Table
3. Households are relatively large and literacy rates low. Agriculture is the predominant activity in
villages and even for half of the urban households. Livestock possession is wide-spread, especially
in the rural sector. Targeted households appear to be slightly oversampled with a targeting share
of around 0.25 in comparison to 0.20 in the population.
As reference variable for our subsequent targeting accuracy analysis, we use the value of non-
durable items purchased by the household head during the thirty days preceding the interview,
as recorded in the household sample survey. We shall point out here that our consumption
variable does not include the value of self-produced consumption items or purchases of durable
(low-frequency) consumption items. Our household survey makes no attempt to record the value
of the household’s entire consumption. From our experience in the field, however, we think that
household head expenditures are a good proxy of mean per capita consumption. Moreover, we also
conduct a robustness check with an alternative consumption measure exploiting the fact that our
survey includes high-frequency consumption expenditures of each adult member of a household.
When we use the sum of these expenditures and divide by the number of household members as
a proxy for per-capita consumption, all of our results remain qualitatively unchanged. Because of
our impression that household heads’ responses are more reliable on average, we only present the
results with household-head consumption in the main text. The respective additional results are
available in the appendix (Table A7).
[Table 3 about here]
4 Empirical methodology
4.1 Target sets
In our main analysis we construct and compare seven different sets of target households. First, the
set of households actually targeted by the communities. We denote the corresponding set of target
households in community c in our sample by TCBTc . For our sample, the remaining six hypothetical
target groups are constructed from the household survey data as follows. Let nCBTc denote the
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number of sample households targeted by the community-based method in community c.7 To
construct Tmc , the hypothetical target set based on method m in community c, we first sort all
sample households in c by the wealth index of method m and select the nCBTc households with
the lowest index values. The aggregate sample target set is the union set Tm = ∪Cc=1Tmc , where
C denotes the number of communities. Following the recent comparative targeting accuracy
literature (Alatas et al., 2012; Filmer and Scott, 2012; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2013; Klasen and
Lange, 2014), we take consumption as the benchmark wealth index and denote by TCON the
benchmark target set. We assess the targeting accuracy of method m in terms of the overlap
of Tm with TCON . In the following, we make precise how we calculate the five PMT indicators
in detail. For considerations of space, estimation outputs and calculations are relegated to the
Online Appendix (see Table A1 for details). Table 4 provides an overview of the five PMT methods
regarding indicators and weights.
[Table 4 about here]
Consumption-oriented PMT
For the consumption-oriented PMT we define a dummy variable EligCONci equal to one if household
i in community c is targeted according to our benchmark. We then estimate the linear regression
model
EligCONci = αc + βxci + uci,
where xci is a vector of proxy variables, β is the corresponding coefficient vector, αc are community
fixed effects, and u is a stochastic error term. We conduct this regression analysis separately for
rural and urban households (see Table A2 in the Online Appendix for the regression output). In
a second step, index values are calculated for each household as Êlig
CON
ci = β̂xci. Third, for each
community, households are sorted with respect to the index value and the nCBTc lowest ranked
households are assigned to T ĈONc .
PMT based on Principal Component Analysis
We apply principal component analysis (PCA) to obtain weights that derive from the joint dis-
tribution of the proxy-means variables themselves. Our PCA-based PMT employs the same set
7 To illustrate, consider a village with 100 households from which 20 have been targeted by the community-based
method. Suppose that, from this village, the household survey includes 10 households with 3 sample households
targeted and 7 not targeted. While the population targeting set contains 20 per cent of all households, all of our
seven sample targeting sets will always contain precisely 3 sample households from that village.
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of indicators as the consumption-oriented PMT. To focus on within-community differences across
households, we first subtract community means from each indicator. Following Filmer and Pritch-
ett (2001), we take the first principal component as wealth index and the corresponding factor
loadings as weights (see Appendix Table A3 for details).
Poverty Scorecards
We first discuss the Poverty Scorecard Index (PSI). We use the 2011 Burkina Faso poverty score-
card from IPA’s website8 to calculate indicator scores and to construct the hypothetical target
set TPSI . Of its ten indicators we omit one which is not covered in our household survey, ’Does
the household own a bed or mattress?’. However, as this indicator accounts for not more than
three per cent of the full score, we are confident that this omission should not threaten its overall
performance. Table A4 of the Online Appendix provides details about this scorecard.
Second, we employ India’s Below the Poverty Line scorecard (Government of India, 2002) to
construct the respective hypothetical target set TBPL. For reasons of data availability we have to
omit one of the thirteen original indicators, ’food security’. In addition, we substitute the origi-
nal indicators ’availability of normal wear clothing’, ’type of indebtedness’, ’reason for migration
from household’, and ’preference for assistance’ with ’drinking water source’, ’type of risk coping’,
’emigration incidence’, and ’use of transfers received’, respectively (see Online Appendix Table A5
for details).
The Multidimensional Poverty Index
We build on the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) by Alkire and Santos (2010). For
reasons of data availability, we make two modifications regarding the health dimension. We omit
the nutrition indicator and substitute the mortality indicator by the incidence of a recent severe
health shock, which is recorded in our sample survey with a recall of one month. We adjust the
weights for this dimension accordingly (see Online Appendix Table A6 for details).
4.2 Targeting accuracy
We take the benchmark target set TCON and assess the targeting accuracy of CBT and the five
PMTs in terms of the mean targeting error. The latter is defined as the proportion of households
8See http://www.progressoutofpoverty.org/country/burkina-faso.
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which are erroneously classified as either poor or non-poor. To be precise, when there are Ic
sample households in community c and n is the total number of observations in the data set,
n =
∑C








 1{ household ci is in TCON and not in Tm}+
1{ household ci is in Tm and not in TCON }
 , (1)
m = {ĈON,PCA,PSI,BPL,MPI,CBT},
where 1{} denotes the indicator function. Notice that the mean targeting error is the sum of
two types of errors. An exclusion error (false negative) occurs when consumption-poor households
are not targeted by the targeting method under consideration. Conversely, households not tar-
geted by consumption but by the targeting method under consideration contribute to an inclusion
error (false positive). The Venn-diagram in Figure 2 illustrates this graphically.
[Figure 2 about here]
As a benchmark for comparison, we also calculate the targeting error when households are
targeted at random. For the sample targeting probabilities of 26 and 24 per cent for rural and
urban communities, respectively, the probabilities for erroneous targeting under random targeting
are 0.74 ·0.26+0.26 ·0.74 = 0.38 and 0.76 ·0.24+0.24 ·0.76 = 0.36, respectively. When we compare
two alternative targeting procedures, A and B, the object of interest is the difference in the mean
targeting error. To conduct statistical inference, we estimate the regression equation
Errcim = γ + δ · 1{m = B}+ ucim,
where Errcim is the targeting error of observation ci with procedure m, the term in brackets in
equation 1, and u is a stochastic error term. Procedure A defines the reference category and the
least squares estimate δ̂ equals the difference between the mean targeting errors of procedures B
and A. The data set for this exercise has 2n observations as every household appears twice, once
with procedure A and once with procedure B. We cluster standard errors at the household level




Table 5 reports mean targeting errors (MTEs) as well as exclusion and inclusion errors by sector.
For the rural sector MTEs are set out in the first column. MTE values range from 0.15 to 0.35,
which amounts to a reduction of the random MTE of 61 to 8 per cent. The consumption-oriented
PMT has by far the lowest MTE with less than every sixth household wrongly classified. The
difference to the next-best method, the PCA-based PMT, is eight percentage points, which is
statistically different from zero at the five percent significance level. Consumption-oriented tar-
geting reduces the MTE in a statistically significant fashion relative to any of the other techniques
(see Appendix Table A8). On the other end, across sectors, the Poverty Scorecard Index and the
MPI deliver only marginal and statistically insignificant (at the five percent level) improvements
relative to random targeting, while the Principal Component performs well in villages and urban
neighborhoods alike. Averaged across sectors, it is the best performing PMT not involving con-
sumption data for obtaining weights, closely followed by the BPL scorecard, whose performance is
not statistically different at conventional levels. Regarding community-based targeting, there are
two salient findings emerging from Table 5. First, averaged across the two sectors (that is across
columns 1 and 4), CBT is about as accurate as the two best performing PMTs not requiring con-
sumption data, PCA and the BPL scorecard. With mean targeting errors roughly twice as large as
those of the consumption-oriented PMT, the average performance of these three procedures is not
statistically different at conventional levels. Second, in relation to the competing PMT methods,
CBT performs somewhat better in the urban neighborhoods than in the villages. In the urban
areas, CBT has a slightly smaller mean targeting error than the PCA-based PMT and the BPL
scorecard. The two differences fail to be significantly different from zero, however, at conventional
levels.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 also contains exclusion and inclusion errors, and the corresponding random targeting
errors as reference. By construction, the number of erroneously included households always equals
the number of erroneously excluded households. Accordingly, the values in columns 2 and 5
equal the mean targeting error divided by two times the sample targeting share of 0.26 and 0.24,
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respectively. The mean inclusion errors are a multiple of the respective exclusion errors, where
the factor of proportionality is the sample targeting share, s say, divided by one minus s. We will
return to the exclusion errors in our cost-effectiveness analysis.
In Table 6 we decompose targeting errors along the consumption distribution. In particular,
we calculate exclusion errors separately for extremely poor and moderately poor households, and
inclusion errors for households around the distribution’s median as well as for relatively aﬄuent
households. We define the expenditure classes such that the shares of extremely and moderately
poor households are roughly equal and sum up to the sample targeting shares of the community-
based targeting exercises, 26 and 24 percent for rural and urban communities, respectively (see
Table 3). The other two expenditure brackets contain the complementary sets of households
and are defined such that they are roughly of equal size; for example in the rural subsample the
aﬄuent and around median expenditure brackets roughly contain the first and second 37 percent
wealthiest households as measured by consumption, respectively. As a consequence, the mean
exclusion and inclusion errors in Table 5 are the arithmetic means of the respective consumption-
bracket-wise errors in Table 6.9 While the point estimates suggest that, relative to the BPL
scorecard, community-based targeting is more accurate in identifying extremely (moderately) poor
households in rural (urban) areas, none of the differences between the PCA-based PMT, the BPL
scorecard and the CBT are statistically significant at conventional levels. When averaged across
sectors, the four best-performing procedures all have in common that the extremely consumption-
poor are identified more accurately than the moderately poor, as would be expected. This pattern
is statistically significant for the consumption-oriented and PCA-based PMTs and CBT at the
five percent significance level. In this regard, community-based targeting is no different from the
three best-performing statistical procedures.
[Table 6 about here]
5.2 Weights and indicators in proxy-means testing
As mentioned earlier (see Table 4), PMTs vary along three dimensions, the set of indicators, the
transformation of indicators into what may be called proxy-means variables or indicator scores, and
9The numbers of households in columns 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8, respectively, are not exactly
equal because of communities where the CBT sample target set or its complement contains an odd number of
households. In that case, we have chosen to allocate the median household of the consumption sample target set
to the moderately poor group and the median household of the complementary group to the around-median group.
Changing this rule does not affect the results substantively.
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the weighting. In section 5.1 we have found that the five different PMTs we consider result in very
different targeting errors. In this section, we explore to what extent these differences in targeting
accuracy can be attributed to the sets of indicators on the one hand and the weighting schemes
on the other. Accordingly, Table 7 reports MTEs for various hypothetical PMT specifications
by sector (see Appendix Tables A8 and A9 for statistical differences). The shaded cells contain
MTEs of the five PMTs considered in the previous analyses. Ten more PMTs are constructed by
varying the five existing PMTs along two dimensions, the set of indicators (in columns), and the
weighting method (in rows).
[Table 7 about here]
For the role of variable selection it is interesting to compare the first three columns, where
the total number of variables is similar. In our context, the variables employed by the MPI
work relatively poorly for targeting consumption-poor households. Across sectors and weighting
methods the MPI has the highest targeting error. Turning to weights, the Poverty Scorecard Index
has the potential to outperform the MPI as well as the BPL-based scorecard when its weights
are appropriately modified. The broad picture emerging for the three PMTs involving normative
choices of indicators, transformations and weights looks such that the PSI is strong regarding
the set of variables but poor regarding the choice of implicit weights. The MPI performs poorly
regarding both, while for the BPL-based scorecard both the set of indicators and the choice of
weights are fair.
Finally, for the weights of the consumption-oriented PMT, we find that the choice of the
dependent variable in the regression delivering the weights makes a non-negligible difference.
When the logarithm of consumption is used (as in Alatas et al., 2012, and others) rather than
the dummy variable Eligible by consumption, the MTE increases from 10 to 16 percent (α = 0.10)
for the urban sector. This suggests that there are important non-linearities in the true regression
function that are better dealt with by our dichotomous specification of the consumption variable.
5.3 Community characteristics and targeting accuracy
Drawing on census data and a vital registration system, we construct four community-level char-
acteristics, community size, economic inequality, as well as indices of ethnic and religious het-
erogeneity. Our measure of economic inequality is a Gini coefficient calculated for a PCA-based
asset index involving 25 commonly used census variables. For our measures of heterogeneity, we
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calculate two indices commonly known as ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which equals the prob-
ability that two randomly drawn individuals from the same community belong to different ethnic
or religious groups, respectively. Table 2 contains summary statistics of these variables and Table
8 the estimation results. Since there would only be 35 and 22 observations for rural and urban
communities, respectively, we pool the two sectors for this exercise. For ease of interpretation, all
four explanatory variables of interest have been standardized.
[Table 8 about here]
We find that the targeting errors of all six methods increase with the size of the commu-
nity. Increasing community size by one standard deviation increases the mean targeting error
by about 3 to 6 percentage points, depending on the targeting method. This relationship is less
pronounced for the consumption-oriented PMT. While such a pattern is certainly expected for
community-based targeting, we find it to some extent surprising that greater community sizes do
not put CBT at a disadvantage relative to the statistical procedures. We do not find a statisti-
cally significant relationship between economic inequality and targeting accuracy. Under plausible
assumptions one would expect the opposite, that greater economic heterogeneity would make tar-
geting outcomes across methods more accurate. Regarding ethnic and religious heterogeneity,
there is no clear pattern. While targeting is more accurate in ethnically more heterogeneous
communities, the opposite is true for religion. Nonetheless, as for the other two community char-
acteristics, all methods respond very similarly to changes in community heterogeneity, in particular
the consumption-oriented PMT and community-based targeting. To summarize, according to the
evidence we find, none of our community characteristics puts one specific method, in particular
statistical or community-based targeting, at an obvious advantage.
5.4 Cost-effectiveness analysis
Given the superior targeting accuracy of the consumption-oriented and partly also the PCA-based
PMT over CBT we will finally compare the cost-effectiveness of the three methods. Mayoux
and Chambers (2005, p.283) state that ’a key advantage of participatory methods is their cost-
effectiveness in rapidly bringing together information and knowledge from many participants.’ In
the same vein, the meta-studies of Coady et al. (2004b, p.61) and Conning and Kevane (2002)
attribute the lower administration costs of CBT to the wage differential between external enumer-
ators and community agents. When a social program’s intention is to reduce poverty and CBT is
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cheaper but at the same time less accurate than statistical targeting, there is a trade-off and the
relatively inexpensive CBT will be more cost-effective than statistical targeting for social programs
with relatively small transfer amounts, while the opposite holds for large transfer amounts. This
is precisely what Alatas et al. (2012) find in their Indonesian context (Table 5, columns 1 and 2,
of their Online Appendix). In the present analysis we will calculate transfer-amount thresholds
for the competing targeting methods. In this context, we make two innovations. First, on the cost
side, we consider alternative scenarios regarding the availability of data for statistical targeting.
Second, on the benefit side, we derive explicit formulae linking exclusion errors from the estima-
tions to poverty reduction instead of relying on simulations (as in Ravallion, 2009; Alatas et al.,
2012; Klasen and Lange, 2015).
We use cost information from the 2009 community-based targeting intervention and approx-
imate implementation costs for the statistical methods based on data collection campaigns in
2010 (Lietz et al., 2015). All figures are inflated to 2014 CFA (African Financial Community)
francs using the consumer price index of Burkina Faso and converted to 2014 US dollars using
the 2014 average exchange rate of 526 Francs per dollar. Total implementation costs for CBT
amount to $2,373. For the PMTs we consider three cost scenarios. First, we assume that census
and household survey information are freely available and only data processing costs of $5,761
for the consumption-oriented and $2,665 for the PCA-based PMT accrue. The difference be-
tween the two amounts reflects the extra work required to process the consumption survey data
for the consumption-oriented PMT. In addition, our second scenario takes into account the data
collection costs for the household consumption survey of $41,899, which is needed to calibrate
the consumption-oriented PMT. Hence we calculate a total cost of $47,660 for the consumption-
oriented PMT, while the cost of the PCA-based PMT remains unchanged. In the third scenario,
for both PMTs, we add the cost of collecting the census data of $36,053, amounting to total costs
of $83,713 and $38,718 for the consumption-oriented and PCA-based PMT, respectively.
In line with existing literature (Ravallion, 2009; Alatas et al., 2012), we consider the extent
of poverty reduction, measured in terms of consumption, as the social benefit of an anti-poverty
program. We calculate a poverty measure of the FGT class (Foster et al., 1984) at the household
level, where, for each community, we set the poverty line equal to the consumption threshold
implied by the twenty percent population targeting share (see Table 2). Given the purpose of
the community targeting exercise studied here, to identify the 20 percent poorest households in
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each community, this definition of poverty seems appropriate. Rather than conducting poverty-
reduction simulations (as in Ravallion, 2009; Alatas et al., 2012; Klasen and Lange, 2015), we
calculate the extent of poverty reduction with a first-order Taylor approximation that yields an
explicit relationship between the exclusion error and poverty reduction.
To fix ideas, we write the benefit-to-cost ratio of an anti-poverty program which transfers t





where ∆Pm denotes the change in the poverty index (at the level of households) and Costm the
total cost of the program divided by the number of households. Benefits as well as costs are, of
course, increasing functions of t. We take the total cost to be the sum of the aggregate transfer
benefit and targeting costs. For a given targeting method, the latter are a fixed cost, while the
former are a variable cost proportional to t. We abstract from other program fixed costs, such as
administrative costs of effecting individual benefits. In the Appendix we show that for the poverty






where p denotes the poverty threshold in dollars and TCm the (fixed) targeting cost per eligible
household, i.e. the total targeting costs divided by the number of beneficiary households. The term
in brackets may be called the inclusion probability of targeting method m, the probability that a
consumption-poor household is correctly targeted by method m. The fraction t/TCm equals the
ratio of transfer benefits to targeting costs. In words, the benefit-cost ratio is a constant, which is
independent of the method, times the product of the inclusion probability and a simple increasing
transformation of the transfer-to-targeting-cost ratio. Equivalently, the said product equals the
ratio of average benefit per consumption-poor household to program costs per poor household.
We limit our attention here to the poverty gap index because it is the only FGT measure which
is linear in the exclusion error as set out in Table 5.10
We now compare the benefit-to-cost ratios for community-based targeting with the consumption-
10In contrast, with the methodology outlined in the Appendix, the change in the headcount ratio is linear in the
exclusion error at the poverty line, whose sample counterpart would suffer from much greater imprecision than the
exclusion errors set out in Table 6.
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oriented and PCA-based proxy means tests. Within our framework, the consumption-oriented
PMT is always most cost-effective for programs with a large transfer benefit per eligible house-
hold, t say, because, as t tends to infinity, the limit of BCR only depends on the targeting method’s
inclusion probability. For small transfer benefits, in contrast, the ratio of the inclusion probability
to the targeting cost is what matters for cost-effectiveness. For all three cost scenarios regard-
ing statistical targeting, CBT always accrues less than half the targeting cost of the two PMTs.
On the other hand, CBT’s inclusion probability consistently exceeds half that of the statistical
procedures (see Table 5 columns 2 and 5), implying that it is the most cost-effective method for
anti-poverty programs with very small transfer amounts. Accordingly, Table 9 contains transfer-
amount thresholds for pairwise comparisons of these three targeting procedures. When only data
processing costs accrue (column 1), community-based targeting is more cost effective for transfer
amounts of up to 1.68 and 2.63 dollars in rural and urban communities, respectively. When all
data collection costs are taken into account, these figures increase to 67.64 and 90.32 dollars, re-
spectively. It is also interesting to compare the two statistical procedures with each other. Recall
that employing principal components does not require the use of consumption data. Accordingly,
in cost scenarios 2 and 3, the consumption-oriented PMT is more cost-effective for only relatively
large transfer amounts, at least in rural areas.
To put these figures in perspective, the effective average benefit per eligible household in our
intervention, a discount on the premium for a twelve-months health insurance police, amounts to
roughly $1.28, which is less than the smallest break-even amount of any of the two PMT-methods.
We conclude that, among the targeting procedures considered here, CBT was indeed the most
cost-effective method for targeting consumption-poor households - even though CBT’s targeting
cost of $2.07 per eligible (or consumption-poor) household amounts to more than three times
the average transfer benefit received by a consumption-poor household ($0.64, one minus CBT’s
average exclusion error of 0.5 times $1.28). Given this seeming disproportion, would an untargeted
subsidy have been more cost-effective? We show in the Appendix that the benefit-to-cost ratio of a
universal transfer program approximately equals 0.2/p, implying a break-even of CBT relative to
the untargeted intervention at a transfer of $1.38 dollars per eligible household. While this figure
suggests that a universal transfer might have been more cost-effective, this simple calculation is
only valid when the transfer per household does not vary along the consumption distribution. In
our context, however, households not eligible for the benefit on average enrolled at more than
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twice the rate of eligible households, which would double an untargeted subsidy’s cost relative
to the na¨ıve scenario just considered and reduce the break-even threshold of CBT to $0.52. We
conclude that, taking into account the wealth gradient in insurance demand, CBT is also more
cost-effective than an untargeted intervention in our empirical context.
6 Discussion
In this section, we summarize our findings and make explicit how they contribute to the existing
literature. First, regarding the performance of various PMTs, we confirm the common and little
surprising finding that the consumption-oriented PMT is by far the most accurate method. Our
findings are partially in accordance with Filmer and Scott (2012), who find no statistical differences
when comparing the PCA-based PMT with other common PMTs that do not involve consumption
data for the calibration. In our setting, the PCA-based PMT performs similarly well as the BPL
scorecard, and significantly better than the PSI and MPI. Second, regarding CBT and PMT
in comparison, our targeting accuracy results are similar to the results obtained in a large field
experiment in Indonesia, where Alatas et al. (2012) find that the consumption-oriented PMT is
about ten percentage points more accurate than the CBT (α = 0.10).
Third, our finding of the CBT’s good performance in urban neighborhoods is novel. CBT
initially emerged from so-called rapid rural appraisals and has so far predominantly been ap-
plied in rural settings (Chambers, 1994a). Coady et al. (2004a) expect the method to perform
worse in urban sectors, where anonymity is greater and hence the information advantage of local
community members smaller. Fourth, the finding that decentralized targeting is less accurate in
bigger communities is in line with Alatas et al. (2012). On the other hand, in the African context
considered here, the accuracy of PMTs suffers from a larger community size to a similar extent,
which is in contrast to the findings of the just-mentioned study in Indonesia. While we are aware
that, with an average of around 110 households, community sizes are moderate in our context,
our finding makes a case for the applicability of community-based targeting beyond small villages.
Finally, findings from our cost-effectiveness calculations demonstrate the trade-off between
CBT’s lower program costs on the one hand and the consumption-oriented PMT’s higher accuracy
on the other. Even if there is much anecdotal evidence for CBT’s relative cost advantage over
statistical targeting methods, there are very few studies including cost data. In our context, where
we consider an inexpensive decentralized expert assessment, community-based targeting is more
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cost-effective than any of the statistical methods. The accuracy gains of the consumption-oriented
PMT outweigh the CBT’s cost advantage only for very large transfer amounts. For the average
transfer in our application, decentralized targeting is clearly the preferable method. But even for
larger, hypothetical transfers, CBT dominates in this African context. For comparison, first, we
consider the Indonesian unconditional cash transfer program investigated by Alatas et al. (2012).
The program’s cash transfers equal about 20 per cent of target households’ budgets, which would
amount to about $14 per household in Burkina Faso, a transfer amount where consumption-
oriented statistical targeting is more cost effective only when data collection costs for the PMT
are kept out of the picture. On the other hand, for a recently piloted conditional cash transfer
program in Burkina Faso, the Nahouri Cash Transfers Pilot Project, which was conducted between
2008 and 2012 and designed to transfer about $80 per targeted household (Akresh et al., 2012),
statistical targeting would be the more cost-effective choice, at least in rural areas.
7 Conclusion
While targeting accuracy assessments of specific welfare programs are numerous, there is only a
small number of studies comparing alternative targeting methods within the same setting. Evi-
dence is even scarcer when it comes to comparisons between statistical and decentralized targeting
methods. In order to fill this research gap we have compared a community-based targeting inter-
vention in Burkina Faso with various common PMTs, which we have calculated from household
survey data. The outstandingly high targeting accuracy of the consumption-oriented PMT in our
study makes a strong case for statistical targeting when the reduction of consumption poverty is
the objective. Nonetheless, we shall close this paper with three remarks concerning decentraliza-
tion of targeting that reach beyond the somewhat narrow domain of targeting accuracy.
First, our cost-effectiveness analysis has revealed that consumption-oriented targeting is ex-
cessively expensive when census data is not readily available. Given that a general census is
typically not carried out more often than every ten years, targeting based on census data will
become less accurate the more outdated the underlying data. Community-targeting exercises, on
the other hand, may be repeated on a revolving basis at a moderate cost and in this way keep
track of poverty transitions of households over time. This argument further suggests that revolv-
ing community-based targeting might be particularly suited for quickly-evolving environments. In
our study area, for example, the community-based targeting exercise has been carried out three
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times between 2007 and 2011.
Second, the participative procedure of community-based targeting likely produces some benefits
of itself. Since the inception of participatory appraisals, local control over the targeting process has
been viewed as a desirable attribute of CBT, powerful enough to increase ownership and awareness,
and foster institutional change (Chambers, 1994b). This view is supported by empirical evidence,
which shows remarkably high approval rates by communities for decentralized targeting methods
(Alatas et al., 2012; Robertson et al., 2014; Schu¨ring, 2014). Savadogo et al. (2016) confirms
this picture for our community-based targeting intervention. In a representative sample of 115
households, they find that more than 85 per cent approve of the targeting method.
Finally, it may be called into question whether consumption should be the sole targeting objec-
tive. Instead, there might be considerable value added to the targeting process when communities’
concepts of poverty are taken into account. Recent empirical evidence on communities’ poverty
perceptions shows that communities consider more dimensions than only consumption (Alatas
et al., 2012) and that their poverty concept is multidimensional (Van Campenhout, 2007). Fur-
thermore, Kebede (2009) shows that poverty perceptions reflect local circumstances and Alderman
(2002) finds that community assessments put more weight on chronic poverty. Considering the
wealth criteria defined by the communities in our targeting exercise, it is striking that communities
define most of the criteria in terms of capabilities such as ’Has insufficient food’, ’Has nothing’
or ’Is not able to solve problems by himself’ (Savadogo et al., 2015). This fits well into Amartya
Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1988) and supports the view that communities consider consump-
tion rather as a ’means to an end’. In this perspective, community-based targeting appears to be
well-suited for translating deprivations in the space of capabilities into targeting outcomes.
Appendix: Targeting accuracy and poverty reduction
We consider a distribution of consumption y characterized by the smooth density function f(y).
Now consider an anti-poverty program that relies on some targeting method. We assume that the
inclusion probability of that method (equal to one minus the exclusion error), IP say, may vary
along the realization of consumption, and accordingly write IP (y). Then, for a given transfer per
eligible household of amount t, which we assume to increase consumption by the same amount,
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the consumption distribution after implementation of the program is
f(y; t) = (1− IP (y)) f(y) + IP (y − t)f(y − t).
In words, the density at y equals the exclusion error at y times the original density at y plus the
inclusion probability at y − t times the original density at y − t. It is easily verified that f(y; t)
integrates to one.







where p is the poverty line. We evaluate poverty reduction resulting from the anti-poverty program
under consideration with a small transfer amount in place by a first-order Taylor expansion, which
equals t times the derivative of P (t) with respect to t evaluated at t equal to zero. Straightforward
calculations yield
∆P ≈ −F (p)
p
E[IP (Y )|Y ≤ p]t. (A1)
Notice that F (p) equals the headcount ratio in the absence of the program, which, according to
our assumptions, is equal to the share of targeted households in the population (20 percent in
our application). Further, E[IP (Y )|Y ≤ p] is just the probability limit of the average sample
inclusion probability, or one minus the exclusion error, where the latter corresponds precisely to
the estimates set out in columns 2 and 5 of Table 5.









we finally notice that the program’s cost per household is
Cost = F (p)(TC + t),
where TC denotes the targeting costs per eligible (or consumption-poor) household and F (p) is
the share of eligible households in all households.
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For an untargeted program, the exclusion error is zero, and hence IP (y) = 1 for all y ≤ p,
which, substituted into equation A1, implies that ∆P ≈ −F (p)t/p. The cost per household now
equals t. No fixed costs accrue because no targeting costs are incurred implying that Cost = t.
Taken together we have that BCR(t) approximately equals the constant F (p)/p. Notice that, by
assumption, F (p) equals 0.2 in our application.
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Figure 1: Location of the study site











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Community-based targeting and community characteristics: sample means
Rural Urban
Community-based targeting
Ranked households per community 116 96
Targeted households per community 23 18
Targeted households per community (share) 0.20 0.19
Targeted by all 3 informants (share) 0.08 0.08
Targeted by exactly 2 informants (share) 0.10 0.11
Targeted by exactly 1 informant (share) 0.21 0.18
Rank correlation between 3 informants 0.66 0.66
Community characteristics
Gini (PCA-based asset index) 0.42 0.43
ELF (Ethnicity) 0.33 0.67
ELF (Religion) 0.38 0.32
Number of communities 35 22
Number of households 3721 2101
Notes: All sample means are calculated at the community level. A community is a rural village or an urban
sub-sector. ELF is the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and measures the probability that two randomly
drawn individuals belong to different ethnic or religious groups, respectively. Gini is the Gini index for an asset
index obtained trough principal-component analysis.
Table 3: Household survey summary statistics
Rural Urban
Consumption
Monthly household head expenditures (CFA) 13,565 29,667
Demographics
Household size 9.40 8.75
Household head literate (incidence) 0.33 0.38
HH head occup. non-agric. (incidence) 0.16 0.50
Asset possession (incidences)
Bullock 0.50 0.40
Goat or sheep 0.83 0.60
Motorbike 0.19 0.33
Bicycle 0.91 0.94
Number of households 349 212
Share of targeted households 0.26 0.24
Notes: The sample reported here is the subset of households in the survey which also appear in the CBT. Monthly
household head expenditures are based on a one month recall.
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Table 4: Targeting methods
Set Description Number of Transformation Weighting of
indicators of indicators indicators
Benchmark
TCON Household head’s monthly consumption
expenditures (one month recall) 1 None None
Targeting based on proxy-means testing
Regression-based
T ĈON Consumption-oriented PMT 44 None OLS
Data-driven
TPCA PMT based on principal-component analysis 44 None PCA
Scorecards
TPSI Poverty scorecard index 9 Ordered categorical OLS
TBPL India’s ’Below the Poverty Line’ scorecard 12 Ordered categorical Uniform
Counting-based
TMPI Multi-dimensional poverty index 9 Binary Uniform
Community-based targeting
TCBT Households identified by three local informants
35
Table 5: Mean targeting error rates
Rural Urban



















Consumption-oriented PMT 0.15 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.07
PCA-based PMT 0.23 0.46 0.16 0.25 0.54 0.17
Scorecards
Below the poverty line 0.28 0.54 0.18 0.24 0.50 0.15
Poverty Scorecard Index 0.35 0.69 0.23 0.35 0.74 0.23
Multidimensional Poverty Index 0.32 0.62 0.21 0.32 0.68 0.21
Community-based targeting 0.29 0.56 0.19 0.22 0.46 0.14
Random targeting error 0.38 0.74 0.26 0.36 0.76 0.24
Number of households 349 89 260 212 50 162
Table 6: Targeting error rates by consumption groups
Targeting error rates
Rural Urban















Dependent variable: Exclusion Error Inclusion Error Exclusion Error Inclusion Error
Consumption-oriented PMT 0.09 0.44 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.04
PCA-based PMT 0.34 0.54 0.20 0.11 0.35 0.67 0.25 0.07
Scorecards
Below the poverty line 0.57 0.52 0.20 0.16 0.30 0.63 0.23 0.07
Poverty Scorecard Index 0.83 0.59 0.24 0.23 0.75 0.73 0.31 0.13
Multidimensional Poverty Index 0.60 0.63 0.23 0.19 0.60 0.73 0.26 0.15
Community-based targeting 0.46 0.63 0.25 0.13 0.35 0.53 0.21 0.07
Random targeting error 0.74 0.74 0.26 0.26 0.76 0.76 0.24 0.24
Number of households 35 54 138 122 20 30 87 75
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Table 7: Mean targeting error rates for alternative sets of indicators and weights
Set of proxy-means variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MPI(#9) PSI(#9) BPL(#12) All(#43)
Weights
Rural (N=349)
Original 0.32 0.35 0.28 .




0.26 0.21 0.24 0.18
Elig(expd)
OLS
0.28 0.21 0.23 0.15
Urban (N=212)
Original 0.32 0.35 0.24 .




0.26 0.23 0.22 0.16
Elig(expd)
OLS
0.25 0.18 0.20 0.10
Notes: The shaded cells contain mean targeting errors for the PMTs used in the main analysis. Further hy-
pothetical PMTs are constructed by disaggregating the five existing PMTs along two dimensions; the set of
indicators (columns) and the weights applied (rows). Weights = Original refers to the original weights used
for the MPI and the two scorecards.
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Table 8: Mean targeting error rates and community characteristics
Dependent variable: Mean targeting error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumpt.- PCA- Scorecards Commun.-
oriented based BPL PSI MPI based
Community Size (in 100 HHs) 0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.05* 0.05** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Gini (PCA-Asset-Index) 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ELF (Ethnicity) 0.06** 0.07* 0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.09**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
ELF (Religion) -0.04* -0.08*** -0.05** -0.01 -0.03 -0.07**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rural sector (dummy variable) 0.10* 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.13
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
Constant 0.08** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Number of communities 57 57 57 57 57 57
F-test for joint significance 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.47 0.03
R2 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.18
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For ease of interpretation
all explanatory variables have been standardized.
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Method A is more cost-effective than method B processing processing processing
for transfer amounts smaller than and no data and consump. and full data
A B collection data collection collection
Rural
CBT Consumption-PMT 1.68 37.13 67.64
CBT PCA-based PMT 0 0 78.77
PCA-based PMT Consumption-PMT 3.89 74.60 56.57
Urban
CBT Consumption-PMT 2.63 49.76 90.32
CBT PCA-based PMT always always always
PCA-based PMT Consumption-PMT 0.89 31.01 12.98
Notes: The maximum transfer for which method A is more cost-effective than method B is calculated by solving
the inequality BCR(y)A ≥ BCR(y)B for y, where BCR(y)K is the benefit-to-cost-ratio of method K. PMT
cost figures are based on a cost study by Lietz et al. (2015). The full data collection costs for the consumption-
oriented PMT include the implementation costs of two data collection campaigns, the consumption survey and
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Figure A1: The survey site
Notes: Map depicts the location and population of the 41 villages. For Nouna town see Figure A2. Created with
GPS Visualizer.
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Figure A2: Nouna town and its neighborhoods
Notes: Map depicts the distribution of households across six town-sectors. The latter are depicted in different
colors. Within in each sector there are two to four neighborhoods depicted by different symbols.
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Total number of variables used 9 9 12 44 44
Demographic characteristics
At least one male HH-Member at age 15 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age 15 2 x x
At least one male HH-Member at age 16 to 60 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age16 to 60 2 x x
At least one male HH-Member at age 60 2 x x
At least one female HH-Member at age 60 2 x x
How many household members are 15-years-old or younger? 7 x
HHHead is married 2 x x
HHHead is polyg married 2 x x
HHHead is not widowed 2 x x
HHHead is male 2 x x
Occupational choice
HHH can read or write 2 x x x
HHH response for literate 2 x x x
No one in the HH is literate 2 x
Any HH member completed primary 2 x x x
No HH member has completed five years of schooling 2 x
Any HH member completed secondary 2 x x
HHH completed secondary 2 x x
Any HH member completed tertiary 2 x x
HHH is not employed in agriculture 2 x x
Any HH member is not employed in agriculture 2 x x x
Share of employable household members 5 x
Type of occupation (nothing, agric., non-agric.) 3 x
Status of children (5-14 years) 3 x
HH head is disabled 2 x x
Dwelling characteristics
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period 2 x x x
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day 2 x x
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank 2 x x
Water is not piped outside 2 x
Source of drinking water 4 x
Drinking Water arrangement 4 x
Sanitation not at the open field 2 x x
Toilet arrangement 3 x
number of rooms n.A. x x
Type of house 5 x
Roof is made of concrete, metal sheets, or tile 2 x x
Wall is not made of ordinary mud or straw 2 x x
Floor is made of cement 2 x x x
Garbage evacuation through dustbin 2 x x
No electricity or solar panel 2 x
Main energy source of lighting 4 x
Cooking fuel is wood 2 x
Asset possession at household level
At least one cart 2 x x
At least one plow 2 x x
At least one bike 2 x x
At least one mbike 2 x x x
At least one car 2 x x
At least one radio 2 x x
At least one tv 2 x x x
At least one tel 2 x x
At least one fridge 2 x x
At least one kitchen 2 x x
Ownership of 3 assets 4 x
HH owns no assets at all 2 x
Livestock possession at household level
At least one horse donkey 2 x x
At least one goat sheep 2 x x
At least one chicken 2 x x
At least one bullock 2 x x
At least one pig 2 x x
Number of bulocks owned by HH head 4 x x
Other
HH experienced at least one severe illnes last month 2 x
Type of risk coping 3 x
At least one HH member emigrated last year 2 x
Usage of transfers received 4 x
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group 2 x x
Relative size of primary agricultural output 5 x
Notes: The second column Categories specifies the number of categories of the variable. The majority of variables
consists of indicator variables which only take on two values.
Table A2: Indicators and weights of the consumption-oriented PMT index
Dependent variable: Eligible by consumption
Rural Urban
Any HH-member with primary education -0.111 -0.155
Any HH-member with secondary education -0.101 0.040
Any HH-member with tertiary education 0.000 0.023
Household head literate (incidence) -0.222 -0.030
HHH response for level2 0.003 -0.086
HHH can read or write 0.147 -0.055
HH head occup. non-agric. (incidence) 0.061 0.035
Incidence of no primagr at HH-level -0.084 0.376
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group 0.196 -0.050
HHHead is disabled 0.033 0.134***
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period 0.015 0.078
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day -0.055 -0.053
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank 0.021 -0.252
Garbage evacuation through dustbin -0.064 0.171
Concrete, metal sheets, or tile 0.073 0.090
No ordinary mud or straw -0.129 -0.143
Floor is made of cement 0.000 -0.089
Not at the open field 0.010 -0.011
Number of rooms 0.017 0.007
At least one Cart -0.038 0.128
At least one Plow 0.017 -0.073
Bicycle 0.134 -0.107
Motorbike 0.031 -0.014
At least one Car 0.093 -0.295
At least one Radio -0.111* -0.080
At least one TV -0.066 -0.194**
At least one Telephone -0.064 0.069
At least one Fridge -0.039 0.110
At least one Kitchen 0.000 -0.162
At least one Horse or donkey 0.067 -0.083
Goat or sheep 0.040 -0.073
At least one Chicken -0.019 0.097
Bullock -0.097 0.077
At least one Pig 0.061 -0.043
There is a male HH-Member at age15 -0.028 -0.102
There is a female HH-Member at age15 -0.099 0.061
There is a male HH-Member at age1660 -0.065 0.043
There is a female HH-Member at age1660 -0.104 -0.164
There is a male HH-Member at age60 0.157* 0.095
There is a female HH-Member at age60 0.118 0.018
HH head is married 0.175 -0.180
HH head is polyg married -0.200 0.178
HH head is not widowed -0.076 -0.288*
HH head is male 0.141 0.024
Observations 349 211
R2 0.39 0.50
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the household level. Regressions
include community fixed effects.
Table A3: Indicators and weights of the PCA-based PMT index
1st principal component factor loadings
Rural Urban
Any HH-member with primary education 0.181 0.267
Any HH-member with secondary education 0.107 0.182
Any HH-member with tertiary education omitted 0.030
Household head is literate 0.155 0.134
HHH response for level2 0.108 0.091
HHH can read or write 0.154 0.125
HH head employed non-agriculturally -0.102 -0.050
No HH member applied in agriculture 0.165 0.122
HHs belongs to ethnic minority group -0.029 -0.033
HHHead is disabled 0.002 -0.049
HH uses running-water or good wells, any period -0.042 0.074
Drinking Water is changed at least every 2nd day 0.002 0.111
Wastewater by cesspool, gutters or septic tank -0.015 -0.031
Garbage evacuation through dustbin 0.011 0.045
Concrete, metal sheets, or tile 0.137 0.142
No ordinary mud or straw 0.041 0.102
Floor is made of cement omitted 0.012
Not at the open field 0.101 0.191
Number of rooms 0.228 0.231
At least one Cart 0.258 0.199
At least one Plow 0.271 0.166
At least one Bicycle 0.170 0.215
At least one Motorbike 0.217 0.208
At least one Car 0.014 0.053
At least one Radio 0.171 0.180
At least one TV 0.164 0.219
At least one Telephone 0.168 0.260
At least one Fridge 0.053 0.047
At least one Kitchen omitted 0.067
At least one Horse or donkey 0.257 0.206
At least one Goat or sheep 0.239 0.183
At least one Chicken 0.169 0.150
At least one Bullock 0.227 0.145
At least one Pig 0.080 0.041
There is a male HH-Member at age15 0.200 0.173
There is a female HH-Member at age15 0.215 0.185
There is a male HH-Member at age1660 0.216 0.240
There is a female HH-Member at age1660 0.204 0.255
There is a male HH-Member at age60 -0.033 -0.017
There is a female HH-Member at age60 0.035 -0.032
HH head is married 0.164 0.128
HH head is polyg married 0.168 0.130
HH head is not widowed 0.141 0.150
HH head is male -0.094 -0.114
Observations 349 211
Number of principal components 41 44
Notes: Weights are derived from a principal component analysis where all variables are first demeaned at the
community level.
Table A4: The Poverty Scorecard Index
Original scorecard for Burkina Faso Scorecard adjusted for our study
Indicator Score Indicator Score
1. How many household members are 14-years-old or younger? 1. How many household members are 15-years-old or younger?
A. Six or more 0 A. Six or more 0
B. Five 5 B. Five 5
C. Four 6 C. Four 6
D. Three 10 D. Three 10
E. Two 13 E. Two 13
F. One 19 F. One 19
G. None 29 G. None 29
2. In what languages can the male head/spouse read and write? 2. HH head can read and/or write
A. None, or no male head/spous 0 A. No 0
B. French only 4 B. Yes 4
C. A non-French language (regardless of French literacy) 5
3. Has the female head/spouse completed first grade? 3. First grade completed by HH head
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. No female head/spouse 0
C. Yes 9 B. Yes 9
4. What is the main source of energy for lighting? 4. What is the main source of energy for lighting?
A. Firewood, or other 0 A. Firewood, or other 0
B. Candles, kerosene, or LPG 4 B. Candles or oil lamp 4
C. Flashlight, or batteries 5 C. Flashlight 5
D. Electricity, or solar energy 8 D. Electricity, solar panel or battery 8
5. What toilet arrangement does the household have? 5. What toilet arrangement does the household have?
A. No toilet arrangement, or other 0 A. Open field 0
B. Non-ventilated pit latrine 4 B. Latrine 4
C. Ventilated pit latrine, or flush to a septic tank 15 C. Ventilated latrine and flush toilet 15
6. Does the household own a television? 6. Does the household own a television?
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. Yes 10 B. Yes 10
7. Does the household own a bed or a mattress? 7. Omitted
A. No 0
B. Yes 3
8. Does the household own a scooter or a motorcycle? 8. Does the household own a scooter or a motorcycle?
A. No 0 A. No 0
B. Yes 6 B. Yes 6
9. Have any household members, in their main 9. Is the primary occupation of the HH head
occupation in the last seven days, worked in in agriculture?
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, or forestry?
A. Yes 0 A. Yes 0
B. No 8 B. No 8
10. How many head of cattle or other large 10. How many head of bullocks does the
animals does the household now own? household head now own?
A. None, or one 0 A. None, or one 0
B. Two 2 B. Two 2
C. Three to five 3 C. Three to five 3
D. Six or more 7 D. Six or more 7






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A7: Mean targeting error rates, alternative consumption definition
Rural Urban



















Consumption-oriented PMT 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.07
PCA-based PMT 0.25 0.48 0.17 0.25 0.54 0.17
Scorecards
Below the poverty line 0.28 0.54 0.18 0.22 0.46 0.14
Poverty Scorecard Index 0.32 0.62 0.21 0.33 0.70 0.22
Multidimensional Poverty Index 0.33 0.65 0.22 0.30 0.64 0.20
Community-based targeting 0.28 0.55 0.19 0.25 0.52 0.16
Random targeting error 0.38 0.74 0.26 0.36 0.76 0.24
Number of households 349 89 260 212 50 162
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